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CONSTRUCTIVE PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF NASH
EQUILIBRIUM IN A FINITE STRATEGIC GAME WITH
SEQUENTIALLY LOCALLY NON-CONSTANT PAYOFF
FUNCTIONS BY SPERNER’S LEMMA
YASUHITO TANAKA
Abstract. Using Sperner’s lemma for modified partition of a simplex we will
constructively prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium in a finite strategic
game with sequentially locally non-constant payoff functions. We follow the
Bishop style constructive mathematics.
1. Introduction
It is often said that Brouwer’s fixed point theorem can not be constructively
proved1. Thus, the existence of a Nash equilibrium in a finite strategic game also
can not be constructively proved. Sperner’s lemma which is used to prove Brouwer’s
theorem, however, can be constructively proved. Some authors have presented a
constructive (or an approximate) version of Brouwer’s theorem using Sperner’s
lemma. See [?] and [?]. Thus, Brouwer’s fixed point theorem can be constructively
proved in its constructive version. Also Dalen in [?] states a conjecture that a
uniformly continuous function f from a simplex to itself, with property that each
open set contains a point x such that x 6= f(x), which means |x − f(x)| > 0, and
also at every point x on the boundaries of the simplex x 6= f(x), has an exact fixed
point. We call such a property of functions local non-constancy. Further we define
a stronger property sequential local non-constancy. In another paper [?] we have
constructively proved Dalen’s conjecture with sequential local non-constancy.
In this paper we present a proof of the existence of a Nash equilibrium in a finite
strategic game with sequentially locally non-constant payoff functions by Sperner’s
lemma. We consider Sperner’s lemma for modified partition of a simplex, and
utilizing it prove the existence of such a Nash equilibrium.
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1[?] provided a constructive proof of Brouwer’s fixed point theorem. But it is not constructive
from the view point of constructive mathematics a´ la Bishop. It is sufficient to say that one
dimensional case of Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, that is, the intermediate value theorem is
non-constructive. See [?] or [?]. On the other hand, in [?] Orevkov constructed a computably
coded continuous function f from the unit square to itself, which is defined at each computable
point of the square, such that f has no computable fixed point. His map consists of a retract of
the computable elements of the square to its boundary followed by a rotation of the boundary of
the square. As pointed out by Hirst in [?], since there is no retract of the square to its boundary,
Orevkov’s map does not have a total extension.
Brouwer’s fixed point theorem can be constructively, in the sense of constructive mathematics
a´ la Bishop, proved only approximately. But the existence of an exact fixed point of a function
which satisfies some property of local non-constancy may be constructively proved.
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Figure 1. Example of graph
In the next section we prove a modified version of Sperner’s lemma. In Section 3
we present a proof of the existence of a Nash equilibrium in a finite strategic game
with sequentially locally non-constant payoff functions by the modified version of
Sperner’s lemma. We follow the Bishop style constructive mathematics according
to [?], [?] and [?].
2. Sperner’s lemma
To prove Sperner’s lemma we use the following simple result of graph theory,
Handshaking lemma2. A graph refers to a collection of vertices and a collection of
edges that connect pairs of vertices. Each graph may be undirected or directed.
Figure 1 is an example of an undirected graph. Degree of a vertex of a graph is
defined to be the number of edges incident to the vertex, with loops counted twice.
Each vertex has odd degree or even degree. Let v denote a vertex and V denote
the set of all vertices.
Lemma 1 (Handshaking lemma). Every undirected graph contains an even number
of vertices of odd degree. That is, the number of vertices that have an odd number
of incident edges must be even.
This is a simple lemma. But for completeness of arguments we provide a proof.
Proof. Prove this lemma by double counting. Let d(v) be the degree of vertex v.
The number of vertex-edge incidences in the graph may be counted in two different
ways; by summing the degrees of the vertices, or by counting two incidences for
every edge. Therefore, ∑
v∈V
d(v) = 2e,
where e is the number of edges in the graph. The sum of the degrees of the vertices
is therefore an even number. It could happen if and only if an even number of the
vertices had odd degree. 
Let ∆ denote an n-dimensional simplex. n is a finite natural number. For exam-
ple, a 2-dimensional simplex is a triangle. Let partition or triangulate a simplex.
Figure 2 is an example of partition (triangulation) of a 2-dimensional simplex. In
2For another constructive proof of Sperner’s lemma, see [?].
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Figure 2. Partition and labeling of 2-dimensional simplex
a 2-dimensional case we divide each side of ∆ in m equal segments, and draw the
lines parallel to the sides of ∆. Then, the 2-dimensional simplex is partitioned into
m2 triangles. We consider partition of ∆ inductively for cases of higher dimension.
In a 3 dimensional case each face of ∆ is a 2-dimensional simplex, and so it is parti-
tioned into m2 triangles in the above mentioned way, and draw the planes parallel
to the faces of ∆. Then, the 3-dimensional simplex is partitioned into m3 trigonal
pyramids. And similarly for cases of higher dimension.
Let K denote the set of small n-dimensional simplices of ∆ constructed by par-
tition. Vertices of these small simplices of K are labeled with the numbers 0, 1, 2,
. . . , n subject to the following rules.
(1) The vertices of ∆ are respectively labeled with 0 to n. We label a point
(1, 0, . . . , 0) with 0, a point (0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) with 1, a point (0, 0, 1 . . . , 0) with
2, . . . , a point (0, . . . , 0, 1) with n. That is, a vertex whose k-th coordinate
(k = 0, 1, . . . , n) is 1 and all other coordinates are 0 is labeled with k for
all k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}.
(2) If a vertex of K is contained in an n − 1-dimensional face of ∆, then this
vertex is labeled with some number which is the same as the number of a
vertex of that face.
(3) If a vertex of K is contained in an n − 2-dimensional face of ∆, then this
vertex is labeled with some number which is the same as the number of a
vertex of that face. And similarly for cases of lower dimension.
(4) A vertex contained inside of ∆ is labeled with an arbitrary number among
0, 1, . . . , n.
Now we modify this partition of a simplex as follows;
Put a point in an open neighborhood around each vertex inside ∆,
and make partition of ∆ replacing each vertex inside ∆ by the point
in each neighborhood. The diameter of each neighborhood should
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Figure 3. Modified partition of a simplex
be sufficiently small relative to the size of each small simplex. We
label the points in ∆ following the rules (1) ∼ (4).
Then we obtain a partition of ∆ illustrated in Figure 3.
We further modify this partition as follows;
Put a point in an open neighborhood around each vertex on a face
(boundary) of ∆, and make partition of ∆ replacing each vertex
on the face by that point in each neighborhood, and we label the
points in ∆ following the rules (1) ∼ (4). This neighborhood is
open in a space with dimension lower than n.
Then, we obtain a partition of ∆ depicted in Figure 4.
A small simplex ofK in this modified partition which is labeled with the numbers
0, 1, . . . , n is called a fully labeled simplex. Now let us prove Sperner’s lemma about
the modified partition of a simplex.
Lemma 2 (Sperner’s lemma). If we label the vertices of K following above rules
(1) ∼ (4), then there are an odd number of fully labeled simplices. Thus, there
exists at least one fully labeled simplex.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
3. Nash equilibrium in strategic game
Let p = (p0,p1, . . . ,pn) be a point in an n-dimensional simplex ∆, and consider
a function ϕ from ∆ to itself. Denote the i-th components of p and ϕ(p) by pi and
ϕi(p) or ϕi.
The definition of local non-constancy of functions is as follows;
Definition 1. (Local non-constancy of functions)
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Figure 4. Modified partition of a simplex: Two
(1) At a point p on the faces (boundaries) of a simplex ϕ(p) 6= p. This means
ϕi(p) > pi or ϕi(p) < pi for at least one i.
(2) In any open set in ∆ there exists a point p such that ϕ(p) 6= p.
Next we define modified local non-constancy of functions as follows;
Definition 2. (Modified local non-constancy of functions)
(1) At the vertices of a simplex ∆ ϕ(p) 6= p.
(2) In any open set contained in the faces of ∆ there exists a point p such that
ϕ(p) 6= p. This open set is open in a space with dimension lower than n.
(3) In any open set in ∆ there exists a point p such that ϕ(p) 6= p.
(2) of the modified local non-constancy implies that every vertex p in a par-
tition of a simplex, for example, as illustrated by white circles in Figure 4 in a
2-dimensional case, can be selected to satisfy ϕ(p) 6= p even when points on the
faces of ∆ (black circles on the edges) do not necessarily satisfy this condition. Even
if a function ϕ does not strictly satisfy the local non-constancy so long as it satisfies
the modified local non-constancy, we can partition ∆ to satisfy the conditions for
Sperner’s lemma.
Further, by reference to the notion of sequentially at most one maximum in [?],
we define the property of sequential local non-constancy.
First we recapitulate the compactness (total boundedness with completeness) of
a set in constructive mathematics. ∆ is compact in the sense that for each ε > 0
there exists a finitely enumerable ε-approximation to ∆3. An ε-approximation to
∆ is a subset of ∆ such that for each p ∈ ∆ there exists q in that ε-approximation
3A set S is finitely enumerable if there exist a natural number N and a mapping of the set
{1, 2, . . . , N} onto S.
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with |p−q| < ε. Each face (boundary) of ∆ is also a simplex, and so it is compact.
According to Corollary 2.2.12 of [?] we have the following result.
Lemma 3. For each ε > 0 there exist totally bounded sets H1, H2, . . . , Hn, each of
diameter less than or equal to ε, such that ∆ = ∪ni=1Hi.
The definition of sequential local non-constancy is as follows;
Definition 3. (Sequential local non-constancy of functions)
(1) At the vertices of a simplex ∆ ϕ(p) 6= p.
(2) Let ∂∆ be a face of ∆. There exists ε¯ with the following property. For
each ε > 0 less than ε¯ there exist totally bounded sets H1, H2, . . . , Hm,
each of diameter less than or equal to ε, such that ∂∆ = ∪mi=1Hi, and if
for all sequences (pn)n≥1, (qn)n≥1 in each Hi, |ϕ(pn) − pn| −→ 0 and
|ϕ(qn)− qn| −→ 0, then |pn − qn| −→ 0.
(3) There exists ε¯ with the following property. For each ε > 0 less than ε¯
there exist totally bounded sets H1, H2, . . . , Hm, each of diameter less than
or equal to ε, such that ∆ = ∪mi=1Hi, and if for all sequences (pn)n≥1,
(qn)n≥1 in each Hi, |ϕ(pn) − pn| −→ 0 and |ϕ(qn) − qn| −→ 0, then
|pn − qn| −→ 0.
(1) of this definition is the same as that of the definition of modified local non-
constancy.
Now we show the following two lemmas.
Lemma 4. Sequential local non-constancy means modified local non-constancy.
The essence of this proof is due to the proof of Proposition 1 of [?].
Proof. Let Hi be a set as defined above. Construct a sequence (rn)n≥1 in Hi such
that |ϕ(rn)− rn| −→ 0. Consider p, q in Hi with p 6= q. Construct an increasing
binary sequence (λn)n≥1 such that
λn = 0⇒ max(|ϕ(p) − p|, |ϕ(q)− q|) < 2
−n,
λn = 1⇒ max(|ϕ(p) − p|, |ϕ(q) − q|) > 2
−n−1.
We may assume that λ1 = 0. If λn = 0, set pn = p and qn = q. If λn = 1, set
pn = qn = rn. Now the sequences (|ϕ(pn)− pn|)n≥1, (|ϕ(qn)− qn|)n≥1 converge
to 0, and so |pn − qn| −→ 0. Computing N such that |pN − qN | < |p− q|, we see
that λN = 1. Therefore, ϕ(p) 6= p or ϕ(q) 6= q. 
The converse of Lemma 4 does not hold because the sequential local non-constancy
implies isolatedness of points r satisfying ϕ(r) = r but the local non-constancy and
the modified local non-constancy do not.
Lemma 5. Let ϕ be a uniformly continuous function from ∆ to itself. Assume
infp∈Hi ϕ(p) = 0 for Hi ⊂ ∆ defined above. If the following property holds:
For each δ > 0 there exists ε > 0 such that if p,q ∈ Hi, |ϕ(p)−p| <
ε and |ϕ(q) − q| < ε, then |p− q| ≤ δ.
Then, there exists a point r ∈ Hi such that ϕ(r) = r.
Proof. Choose a sequence (pn)n≥1 in Hi such that |ϕ(pn)−pn| −→ 0. Compute N
such that |ϕ(pn)−pn| < ε for all n ≥ N . Then, form,n ≥ N we have |pm−pn| ≤ δ.
Since δ > 0 is arbitrary, (pn)n≥1 is a Cauchy sequence in Hi, and converges to a
limit r ∈ Hi. The continuity of ϕ yields |ϕ(r) − r| = 0, that is, ϕ(r) = r. 
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Now we look at the problem of the existence of a Nash equilibrium in a finite
strategic game according to [?]. A Nash equilibrium of a finite strategic game is a
state where all players choose their best responses to strategies of other players.
Consider an n-players strategic game with m pure strategies for each player. n
and m are finite natural numbers not smaller than 2. Let Si be the set of pure
strategies of player i, and denote his each pure strategy by sij . His mixed strategy
is defined as a probability distribution over Si, and is denoted by pi. Let pij be
a probability that player i chooses sij , then we must have
∑m
j=1 pij = 1 for all i.
A combination of mixed strategies of all players is called a profile. It is denoted
by p. Let pii(p) be the expected payoff of player i at profile p, and pii(sij ,p−i)
be his payoff when he chooses a strategy sij at that profile, where p−i denotes a
combination of mixed strategies of players other than i at profile p. pii(p) is written
as follows;
pii(p) = pii(pi,p−i) =
∑
{j:pij>0}
pijpii(sij ,p−i)
Assume that the values of payoffs of all players are finite. Then, since pure strategies
are finite, and expected payoffs are linear functions about probability distributions
over the sets of pure strategies of all players, pii(p) is uniformly continuous about
p.
For each i and j let
vij = pij +max(pii(sij ,p−i)− pii(p), 0),
and define the following function.
ψij(p) =
vij
vi1 + vi2 + · · ·+ vim
, (1)
where
∑m
j=1 ψij = 1 for all i. Let ψi(p) = (ψi1, ψi2, . . . , ψim), ψ(p) = (ψ1, ψ2, · · · , ψn).
Since each ψi is an m-dimensional vector such that the values of its components are
between 0 and 1, and the sum of its components is 1, it represents a point on an
m−1-dimensional simplex. ψ(p) is a combination of vectors ψi’s. It is a vector such
that its components are components of ψi(p) for all players. Thus, it is a vector with
n×m components, but since the number of independent components is n(m− 1),
the range of ψ is the n-times product of m− 1-dimensional simplices. It is convex,
and homeomorphic to an n(m−1)-dimensional simplex. p = (p1,p2, . . . ,pn) is also
a vector with n×m components, and the number of its independent components is
n(m−1). Thus, the domain of ψ is the same set as the range of ψ, and a uniformly
continuous function from the domain of ψ to its range corresponds one to one to a
uniformly continuous function from an n(m− 1)-dimensional simplex to itself.
Let us consider a homeomorphism between an n(m−1)-dimensional simplex and
the space of players’ mixed strategies which is denoted by P. Figure 5 depicts an
example of a case of two players with two pure strategies for each player. Vertices
D, E, F and G represent states where two players choose pure strategies, and
points on edges DE, EF , FG and GD represent states where one player chooses a
pure strategy. In such a homeomorphism vertices of the simplex do not correspond
to any vertex of P. Vertices of the simplex and points on faces (simplices whose
dimension is lower than n(m− 1)) of the simplex correspond to the points on faces
of P. For example, in Figure 5 A, B and C correspond, respectively, to I, J and
H . We make these points satisfy the condition of the following sequential local
non-constancy. On the other hand, each vertex of P, D, E, F and G corresponds,
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Figure 5. Homeomorphism between simplex and combination of strategies
respectively, to itself on a face of the simplex which contains it. Next we assume
the following conditions.
Definition 4. (Sequential local non-constancy of payoff functions)
(1) At points in P corresponding to vertices of ∆ pii(sij ,p−i) − pii(p) > 0 for
some i and j.
(2) Let ∂P be a face of P in which some players choose pure strategies. There
exists ε¯ with the following property. For each ε > 0 less than ε¯ there exist
totally bounded sets H1, H2, . . . , Hm, each of diameter less than or equal
to ε, such that ∂P = ∪mi=1Hi, and if for all sequences (pn)n≥1, (qn)n≥1
in each Hi, max(pii(sij , (pn)−i) − pii(pn), 0) −→ 0, max(pii(sij , (qn)−i) −
pii(qn), 0) −→ 0 for all sij ∈ Si for all i, then |pn − qn| −→ 0.
(3) There exists ε¯ with the following property. For each ε > 0 less than ε¯ there
exist totally bounded sets H1, H2, . . . , Hm, each of diameter less than or
equal to ε, such that P = ∪mi=1Hi, and if for all sequences (pn)n≥1, (qn)n≥1
in each Hi, max(pii(sij , (pn)−i) − pii(pn), 0) −→ 0, max(pii(sij , (qn)−i) −
pii(qn), 0) −→ 0 for all sij ∈ Si for all i, then |pn − qn| −→ 0.
By the sequential local non-constancy of payoff functions we obtain the following
results.
(1) At points in P corresponding to vertices of ∆,
∑
j,pij>0
pijpii(sij ,p−i) =
pii(p) for each i implies that ψij(p) 6= pij for some i and j.
(2) By (2) of the definition of sequential local non-constancy of payoff functions,
for each ε > 0 less than ε¯ there exist totally bounded sets H1, H2, . . . , Hm,
each of diameter less than or equal to ε, such that ∂P = ∪mi=1Hi, and if
for all sequences (pn)n≥1, (qn)n≥1 in each Hi, |ψ(pn) − pn| −→ 0 and
|ψ(qn)− qn| −→ 0, then |pn − qn| −→ 0.
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(3) By (3) of the definition of sequential local non-constancy of payoff functions,
For each ε > 0 less than ε¯ there exist totally bounded sets H1, H2, . . . , Hm,
each of diameter less than or equal to ε, such that P = ∪mi=1Hi, and if
for all sequences (pn)n≥1, (qn)n≥1 in each Hi, |ψ(pn) − pn| −→ 0 and
|ψ(qn)− qn| −→ 0, then |pn − qn| −→ 0.
Let replace n by n(m− 1). We show the following theorem.
Theorem 1. In any finite strategic game with sequentially locally non-constant
payoff functions there exists a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let us prove this theorem through some steps.
(1) First we show that we can partition an n(m − 1)-dimensional simplex ∆
so that the conditions for Sperner’s lemma (for modified partition of a
simplex) are satisfied. We partition ∆ according to the method in the
proof of Sperner’s lemma, and label the vertices of simplices constructed
by partition of ∆. It is important how to label the vertices contained in
the faces of ∆. Let K be the set of small simplices constructed by partition
of ∆, p = (p0,p1, . . . ,pn(m−1)) be a vertex of a simplex of K, and denote
the i-th coordinate of ψ(p) by ψi or ψi(p). We label a vertex p according
to the following rule,
If pk > ψk, we label p with k.
If there are multiple k’s which satisfy this condition, we label p conveniently
for the conditions for Sperner’s lemma to be satisfied.
We consider labeling for vertices about three cases.
(a) Vertices of ∆:
One of the coordinates of a vertex p of ∆ is 1, and all other coordinates
are zero. Consider a vertex (1, 0, . . . , 0). ψ(p) 6= p means ψj > pj or
ψj < pj for at least one j. ψi < pi can not hold for i 6= 0. On
the other hand, ψ0 > p0 can not hold. When ψ0(p) < p0, we label
p with 0. Assume that ψi(p) > pi = 0 for some i 6= 0. Then, since∑n(m−1)
j=0 ψj(p) = 1 = p0, we have ψ0(p) < p0. Therefore, p is labeled
with 0. Similarly a vertex p whose k-th coordinate is 1 is labeled with
k for all k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n(m− 1)}.
(b) Vertices on the faces of ∆:
Let p be a vertex of a simplex contained in an n(m−1)−1-dimensional
face of ∆ such that pi = 0 for one i among 0, 1, 2, . . . , n(m − 1) (its
i-th coordinate is 0). ψ(p) 6= p means that ψj > pj or ψj < pj
for at least one j. ψi < pi = 0 can not hold. When ψk < pk for
some k 6= i, we label p with k. Assume ψi > pi = 0. Then, since∑n(m−1)
j=0 pj =
∑n(m−1)
j=0 ψj = 1, we have ψk < pk for some k 6= i, and
we label p with k. Assume that ψj > pj for some j 6= i. Then, we
have
n(m−1)∑
l=0,l 6=j
ψl <
n(m−1)∑
l=0,l 6=j
pl,
and so ψk < pk for some k 6= i, j. Thus, we label p with k.
We have proved that we can label each vertex of a simplex contained
in an n(m − 1) − 1-dimensional face of ∆ such that pi = 0 for one i
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among 0, 1, 2, . . . , n(m− 1) with the number other than i. By similar
procedures we can show that we can label the vertices of a simplex
contained in an n(m − 1)− 2-dimensional face of ∆ such that pi = 0
for two i’s among 0, 1, 2, . . . , n(m − 1) with the number other than
those i’s, and so on.
Consider the case where, for example, pi = pi+1 = 0.
Neither ψi < pi = 0 nor ψi < pi+1 = 0 can hold. When
ψk < pk for some j 6= i, i + 1, we label p with k. As-
sume ψi > pi = 0 or ψi+1 > pi+1 = 0. Then, since∑n(m−1)
j=0 pj =
∑n(m−1)
j=0 ψj = 1, we have ψk < pk for
some k 6= i, i + 1, and we label p with k. Assume that
ψj > pj for some j 6= i, i+ 1. Then, we have
n(m−1)∑
l=0,l 6=j
ψl <
n(m−1)∑
l=0,l 6=j
pl,
and so ψk < pk for some k 6= i, i + 1, j. Thus, we label p
with k.
(c) Vertices of small simplices inside ∆:
By the modified local non-constancy of ψ every vertex p in a modified
partition of a simplex can be selected to satisfy ψ(p) 6= p. Assume
that ψi > pi for some i. Then, since
∑n(m−1)
j=0 pj =
∑n(m−1)
j=0 ψj = 1,
we have
ψk < pk
for some k 6= i, and we label p with k.
Therefore, the conditions for Sperner’s lemma (for modified partition of
a simplex) are satisfied, and there exist an odd number of fully labeled
simplices in K.
(2) Suppose that we partition ∆ sufficiently fine so that the distance between
any pair of the vertices of simplices of K is sufficiently small. Let δn(m−1)
be a fully labeled n(m − 1)-dimensional simplex of K, and p0,p1, . . .
and pn(m−1) be the vertices of δn(m−1). We name these vertices so that
p0,p1, . . . ,pn(m−1) are labeled, respectively, with 0, 1, . . . , n(m− 1). The
values of ψ at theses vertices are ψ(p0), ψ(p1), . . . and ψ(pn(m−1)). The
j-th coordinates of pi and ψ(pi), i = 0, 1, . . . , n(m− 1), are, respectively,
denoted by pij and ψj(p
i). About p0, from the labeling rules we have
p00 > ψ0(p
0). About p1, also from the labeling rules we have p11 > ψ1(p
1).
Since n and m are finite, by the uniform continuity of ψ there exists δ > 0
such that if |pi − pj | < δ, then |ψ(pi) − ψ(pj)| < ε2n(m−1)[n(m−1)+1] for
ε > 0 and i 6= j. |ψ(p0) − ψ(p1)| < ε2n(m−1)[n(m−1)+1] means ψ1(p
1) >
ψ1(p
0) − ε2n(m−1)[n(m−1)+1] . On the other hand, |p
0 − p1| < δ means
p01 > p
1
1 − δ. We can make δ satisfying δ <
ε
2n(m−1)[n(m−1)+1] . Thus, from
p01 > p
1
1 − δ, p
1
1 > ψ1(p
1), ψ1(p
1)
> ψ1(p
0)−
ε
2n(m− 1)[n(m− 1) + 1]
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we obtain
p01 > ψ1(p
0)− δ −
ε
2n(m− 1)[n(m− 1) + 1]
> ψ1(p
0)−
ε
n(m− 1)[n(m− 1) + 1]
By similar arguments, for each i other than 0,
p0i > ψi(p
0)−
ε
n(m− 1)[n(m− 1) + 1]
. (2)
For i = 0 we have
p00 > ψ0(p
0) (3)
Adding (2) and (3) side by side except for some i (denote it by k) other
than 0,
n(m−1)∑
j=0,j 6=k
p0j >
n(m−1)∑
j=0,j 6=k
ψj(p
0)−
[n(m− 1)− 1]ε
n(m− 1)[n(m− 1) + 1]
.
From
∑n(m−1)
j=0 p
0
j = 1,
∑n(m−1)
j=0 ψj(p
0) = 1 we have 1−p0k > 1−ψk(p
0)−
[n(m−1)−1]ε
n(m−1)[n(m−1)+1] , which is rewritten as
p0k < ψk(p
0) +
[n(m− 1)− 1]ε
n(m− 1)[n(m− 1) + 1]
.
Since (2) implies p0k > ψk(p
0)− ε
n(m−1)[n(m−1)+1] , we have
ψk(p
0)−
ε
n(m− 1)[n(m− 1) + 1]
< p0k < ψk(p
0)
+
[n(m− 1)− 1]ε
n(m− 1)[n(m− 1) + 1]
.
Thus,
|p0k − ψk(p
0)| <
[n(m− 1)− 1]ε
n(m− 1)[n(m− 1) + 1]
(4)
is derived. On the other hand, adding (2) from 1 to n(m− 1) yields
n(m−1)∑
j=1
p0j >
n(m−1)∑
j=1
ψj(p
0)−
ε
n(m− 1) + 1
.
From
∑n(m−1)
j=0 p
0
j = 1,
∑n(m−1)
j=0 ψj(p
0) = 1 we have
1− p00 > 1− ψ0(p
0)−
ε
n(m− 1) + 1
. (5)
Then, from (3) and (5) we get
|p00 − ψ0(p
0)| <
ε
n(m− 1) + 1
. (6)
From (4) and (6) we obtain the following result,
|p0i − ψi(p
0)| <
ε
n(m− 1) + 1
for all i.
Thus,
|p0 − ψ(p0)| < ε. (7)
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Since ε is arbitrary, we have infp∈∆ |ψ(p) − p| = 0.
(3) Since as described in Definition 3 ∆ =
∑n
i=1Hi, where each Hi is a totally
bounded set whose diameter is less than or equal to ε, for at least one
Hi we have infp∈Hi |ψ(p) − p| = 0. Choose a sequence (rn)n≥1 such that
|ψ(rn) − rn| −→ 0 in such Hi. In view of Lemma 5 it is enough to prove
that the following condition holds.
For each ε > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that if p,q ∈ Hi, |ψ(p) −
p| < δ and |ψ(q)− q| < δ, then |p− q| ≤ ε.
Assume that the set
T = {(p,q) ∈ Hi ×Hi : |p− q| ≥ ε}
is nonempty and compact4. Since the mapping (p,q) −→ max(|ψ(p) −
p|, |ψ(q) − q|) is uniformly continuous, we can construct an increasing bi-
nary sequence (λn)n≥1 such that
λn = 0⇒ inf
(p,q)∈T
max(|ψ(p) − p|, |ψ(q)− q|) < 2−m,
λn = 1⇒ inf
(p,q)∈T
max(|ψ(p)− p|, |ψ(q) − q|) > 2−m−1.
It suffices to find n such that λn = 1. In that case, if |ψ(p)− p| < 2
−m−1,
|ψ(q) − q| < 2−m−1, we have (p,q) /∈ T and |p− q| ≤ ε. Assume λ1 = 0.
If λn = 0, choose (pn,qn) ∈ T such that max(|ψ(pn) − pn|, |ψ(qn) −
qn|) < 2
−m, and if λn = 1, set pn = qn = rn. Then, |ψ(pn) − pn| −→ 0
and |ψ(qn) − qn| −→ 0, so |pn − qn| −→ 0. Computing N such that
|pN − qN | < ε, we must have λN = 1. We have completed the proof of the
existence of a point which satisfies ψ(p) = p.
(4) Denote one of the points which satisfy ψ(p) = p by p˜ = (p˜1, p˜2, . . . , p˜n)
and the components of p˜i by p˜ij . Then, we have
ψij = p˜ij , for all i and j.
By the definition of ψij
p˜ij +max(pii(sij , p˜−i)− pii(p˜), 0)
1 +
∑m
k=1max(pii(sik, p˜−i)− pii(p˜), 0)
= p˜ij .
Let λ =
∑m
k=1max(pii(sik, p˜−i)− pii(p˜), 0), then
max(pii(sij , p˜−i)− pii(p˜), 0) = λp˜ij ,
where p˜−i denotes a combination of mixed strategies of players other than
i at profile p˜.
Since pii(p˜) =
∑
{j:p˜ij>0}
p˜ijpii(sij , p˜i), it is impossible that max(pii(sij , p˜−i)−
pii(p˜), 0) = pii(sij , p˜−i)−pii(p˜) > 0 for all j satisfying p˜ij > 0. Thus, λ = 0,
and max(pii(sij , p˜−i) − pii(p˜), 0) = 0 holds for all sij ’s whether p˜ij > 0 or
not, and it holds for all players. Then, strategies of all players in p˜ are best
responses each other, and a state where all players choose these strategies
is a Nash equilibrium.

4See Theorem 2.2.13 of [?].
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Player 2
X Y
Player X 2, 2 0, 3
1 Y 3, 0 1, 1
Table 1. Example of game 1
Consider two examples. See a game in Table 1. It is an example of the so-called
Prisoners’ Dilemma. Pure strategies of Player 1 and 2 are X and Y . The left side
number in each cell represents the payoff of Player 1 and the right side number
represents the payoff of Player 2. Let pX and 1− pX denote the probabilities that
Player 1 chooses, respectively, X and Y , and qX and 1−qX denote the probabilities
for Player 2. Denote the expected payoffs of Player 1 and 2 by pi1(pX , qX) and
pi2(pX , qX). Then,
pi1(pX , qX) = 2pXqX + 3(1− pX)qX + (1− pX)(1− qX)
= 1− pX + 2qX ,
and
pi2(pX , qX) = 2pXqX + 3pX(1 − qX) + (1− pX)(1− qX)
= 1− qX + 2pX .
Denote the payoff of Player 1 when he chooses X by pi1(X, qX), and that when he
chooses Y by pi1(Y, qX). Similarly for Player B. Then,
pi1(Y, qX) = 1 + 2qX > pi1(pX , qX) for any qX and pX > 0,
pi2(pX , Y ) = 1 + 2pX > pi2(pX , qX) for any pX and qX > 0.
We can select points in P in (1) of Definition 4 which correspond to vertices of
∆ so that pi1(Y, qX) > pi1(pX , qX) and pi2(pX , Y ) > pi2(pX , qX) hold.
Consider two sequences of pX , (pX(m))m≥1 and (p
′
X(m))m≥1 such that pX(m) >
0 and p′X(m) > 0. If max(max(pi1(X, qX), pi1(Y, qX))−pi1(pX(m), qX), 0) = max(pi1(Y, qX)−
pi1(pX(m), qX), 0) −→ 0 and max(max(pi1(X, qX), pi1(Y, qX))−pi1(p
′
X(m), qX), 0) =
max(pi1(Y, qX) − pi1(p
′
X(m), qX), 0) −→ 0, then pX(m) −→ 0, p
′
X(m) −→ 0 and
|pX(m)− p
′
X(m)| −→ 0.
Consider two sequences of qX , (qX(m))m≥1 and (q
′
X(m))m≥1 such that qX(m) >
0 and q′X(m) > 0. If max(max(pi2(pX , X), pi2(pX , Y ))−pi2(pX , qX(m)), 0) = max(pi2(pX , Y )−
pi2(pX , qX(m)), 0) −→ 0 and max(max(pi2(pX , X), pi2(pX , Y ))−pi2(pX , q
′
X(m)), 0) =
max(pi2(pX , Y ) − pi2(pX , q
′
X(m)), 0) −→ 0, then qX(m) −→ 0, q
′
X(m) −→ 0 and
|qX(m)− q
′
X(m)| −→ 0.
Therefore, the payoff functions are sequentially locally non-constant.
Player 2
X Y
Player X 2, 1 0, 0
1 Y 0, 0 1, 2
Table 2. Example of game 2
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Let us consider another example. See a game in Table 2. It is an example of the
so-called Battle of the Sexes Game. Notations are the same as those in the previous
example. The expected payoffs of players are as follows;
pi1(pX , qX) = 2pXqX + (1− pX)(1 − qX)
= 1 + pX(3qX − 1)− qX ,
pi1(X, qX) = 2qX ,
pi1(Y, qX) = 1− qX ,
pi2(pX , qX) = pXqX + 2(1− pX)(1 − qX)
= 2 + qX(3pX − 2)− 2pX ,
pi2(pX , X) = pX ,
and
pi2(pX , Y ) = 2− 2pX .
Then,
• When qX >
1
3 , pi1(X, qX) > pi1(pX , qX) for pX < 1.
• When qX <
1
3 , pi1(Y, qX) > pi1(pX , qX) for pX > 0.
• When pX >
2
3 , pi2(pX , X) > pi2(pX , qX) for qX < 1 .
• When pX <
2
3 , pi2(pX , Y ) > pi2(pX , qX) for qX > 0 .
We can select points in P in (1) of Definition 4 which correspond to vertices of ∆
so that pi1(X, qX) > pi1(pX , qX), pi1(Y, qX) > pi1(pX , qX), pi2(pX , X) > pi2(pX , qX)
or pi2(pX , Y ) > pi2(pX , qX) hold.
Consider sequences (pX(m))m≥1, (p
′
X(m))m≥1, (qX(m))m≥1 and (q
′
X(m))m≥1.
(1) When pX >
2
3 , qX >
1
3 , if max(pi1(X, qX) − pi1(pX(m), qX), 0) −→ 0 and
max(pi1(X, qX)−pi1(p
′
X(m), qX), 0) −→ 0, then pX(m) −→ 1, p
′
X(m) −→ 1
and |pX(m)− p
′
X(m)| −→ 0.
If max(pi2(pX , X)−pi2(pX , qX(m)), 0) −→ 0 and max(pi2(pX , X)−pi2(pX , q
′
X(m)), 0) −→
0, then qX(m) −→ 1, q
′
X(m) −→ 1 and |qX(m)− q
′
X(m)| −→ 0.
(2) When pX <
2
3 , qX <
1
3 , if max(pi1(Y, qX) − pi1(pX(m), qX), 0) −→ 0 and
max(pi1(Y, qX)− pi1(p
′
X(m), qX), 0) −→ 0, then pX(m) −→ 0, p
′
X(m) −→ 0
and |pX(m)− p
′
X(m)| −→ 0.
If max(pi2(pX , Y )−pi2(pX , qX(m)), 0) −→ 0 and max(pi2(pX , Y )−pi2(pX , q
′
X(m)), 0) −→
0, then qX(m) −→ 0, q
′
X(m) −→ 0 and |qX(m)− q
′
X(m)| −→ 0.
(3) When pX <
2
3 , qX >
1
3 , there exists no pair of sequences (pX(m))m≥1
and (qX(m))m≥1 such that max(pi1(X, qX) − pi1(pX(m), qX), 0) −→ 0 and
max(pi2(pX , Y )− pi2(pX , qX(m)), 0) −→ 0.
(4) When pX >
2
3 , qX <
1
3 , there exists no pair of sequences (pX(m))m≥1
and (qX(m))m≥1 such that max(pi1(Y, qX) − pi1(pX(m), qX), 0) −→ 0 and
max(pi2(pX , X)− pi2(pX , qX(m)), 0) −→ 0.
(5) When 23 − ε < pX <
2
3 + ε,
1
3 − ε < qX <
1
3 + ε with 0 < ε <
1
3 , if
max(pi1(X, qX)−pi1(pX(m), qX), 0) −→ 0, max(pi1(Y, qX)−pi1(pX(m), qX), 0) −→
0, max(pi2(pX , X)−pi2(pX , qX(m)), 0) −→ 0 and max(pi2(pX , Y )−pi2(pX , qX(m)), 0) −→
0, then (pX(m), qX(m)) −→ (
2
3 ,
1
3 ) for all sequences (pX(m))m≥1 and (qX(m))m≥1.
The payoff functions are sequentially locally non-constant.
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4. Concluding Remarks
As a future research program we are studying the following themes.
(1) An application of the method of this paper to economic theory, in particular,
the problem of the existence of an equilibrium in competitive economy
with excess demand functions which have the property that is similar to
sequential local non-constancy.
(2) A generalization of the result of this paper to Kakutani’s fixed point theo-
rem for multi-valued functions with property of sequential local non-constancy
and its application to economic theory.
Appendix A. Proof of Sperner’s lemma
We prove this lemma by induction about the dimension of ∆. When n = 0, we
have only one point with the number 0. It is the unique 0-dimensional simplex.
Therefore the lemma is trivial. When n = 1, a partitioned 1-dimensional simplex is
a segmented line. The endpoints of the line are labeled distinctly, by 0 and 1. Hence
in moving from endpoint 0 to endpoint 1 the labeling must switch an odd number
of times, that is, an odd number of edges labeled with 0 an 1 may be located in
this way.
Next consider the case of 2 dimension. Assume that we have partitioned a 2-
dimensional simplex (triangle) ∆ as explained above. Consider the face of ∆ labeled
with 0 and 15. It is the base of the triangle in Figure 6. Now we introduce a dual
graph that has its nodes in each small triangle of K plus one extra node outside
the face of ∆ labeled with 0 and 1 (putting a dot in each small triangle, and one
dot outside ∆). We define edges of the graph that connect two nodes if they share
a side labeled with 0 and 1. See Figure 6. White circles are nodes of the graph, and
thick lines are its edges. Since from the result of 1-dimensional case there are an
odd number of faces of K labeled with 0 and 1 contained in the face of ∆ labeled
with 0 and 1, there are an odd number of edges which connect the outside node and
inside nodes. Thus, the outside node has odd degree. Since by the Handshaking
lemma there are an even number of nodes which have odd degree, we have at least
one node inside the triangle which has odd degree. Each node of our graph except
for the outside node is contained in one of small triangles of K. Therefore, if a
small triangle of K has one face labeled with 0 and 1, the degree of the node in
that triangle is 1; if a small triangle of K has two such faces, the degree of the node
in that triangle is 2, and if a small triangle of K has no such face, the degree of the
node in that triangle is 0. Thus, if the degree of a node is odd, it must be 1, and
then the small triangle which contains this node is labeled with 0, 1 and 2 (fully
labeled). In Figure 6 triangles which contain one of the nodes A, B, C are fully
labeled triangles.
Now assume that the lemma holds for dimensions up to n − 1. Assume that
we have partitioned an n-dimensional simplex ∆. Consider the fully labeled face
of ∆ which is a fully labeled n − 1-dimensional simplex. Again we introduce a
dual graph that has its nodes in small n-dimensional simplices of K plus one extra
node outside the fully labeled face of ∆ (putting a dot in each small n-dimensional
simplex, and one dot outside ∆). We define the edges of the graph that connect
5We call edges of triangle ∆ faces to distinguish between them and edges of a dual graph which
we will consider later.
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Figure 6. Sperner’s lemma
two nodes if they share a face labeled with 0, 1, . . . , n − 1. Since from the result
of n − 1-dimensional case there are an odd number of fully labeled faces of small
simplices of K contained in the n− 1-dimensional fully labeled face of ∆, there are
an odd number of edges which connect the outside node and inside nodes. Thus,
the outside node has odd degree. Since, by the Handshaking lemma there are an
even number of nodes which have odd degree, we have at least one node inside the
simplex which has odd degree. Each node of our graph except for the outside node
is contained in one of small n-dimensional simplices of K. Therefore, if a small
simplex of K has one fully labeled face, the degree of the node in that simplex is 1;
if a small simplex of K has two such faces, the degree of the node in that simplex
is 2, and if a small simplex of K has no such face, the degree of the node in that
simplex is 0. Thus, if the degree of a node is odd, it must be 1, and then the small
simplex which contains this node is fully labeled.
If the number (label) of a vertex other than vertices labeled with
0, 1, . . . , n− 1 of an n-dimensional simplex which contains a fully
labeled n−1-dimensional face is n, then this n-dimensional simplex
has one such face, and it is a fully labeled n-dimensional simplex.
On the other hand, if the number of that vertex is other than n,
then the n-dimensional simplex has two such faces.
We have completed the proof of Sperner’s lemma.
Since n and partition of ∆ are finite, the number of small simplices constructed
by partition is also finite. Thus, we can constructively find a fully labeled n-
dimensional simplex of K through finite steps.
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